New Zealand prides itself on ranking among the world’s least corrupt nations. In 2024, Transparency International ranked New Zealand third globally, behind only Singapore and Denmark.¹ Yet this reputation masks a troubling reality: New Zealand lacks the robust anti-corruption infrastructure that exists across every Australian state and at the federal level.

This investigation examines whether political activities documented in investigative works—activities that shocked New Zealanders but resulted in no corruption investigations—would trigger prosecution or political career-ending inquiries if they occurred in Australia. The evidence suggests they would.

More critically, this article examines whether coordinated smear campaigns against politicians and private citizens constituted criminal harassment that New Zealand Police failed to investigate, and whether such conduct would face prosecution in Australia. It also analyses whether systematic police failures to investigate corrupt behaviour would occur under Australian integrity frameworks.

The pattern: Corruption exposed in Australia, not New Zealand

Two cases illustrate how Australia’s anti-corruption infrastructure catches conduct that New Zealand’s system misses—and raise troubling questions about whether New Zealand’s oversight failures extend to its most senior law enforcement positions.

Rodger Kerr-Newell: The serial CEO

Rodger Kerr-Newell served as chief executive of Hutt City Council, New Plymouth District Council, and Rodney District Council in New Zealand before taking the same role at Shire of Halls Creek in Western Australia in 2013.² During his tenure at Rodney, he received over $700,000 in his final 12 months and a termination package of $349,000—the highest of any outgoing Auckland Council chief executives.

In 2018, the Western Australian Corruption and Crime Commission (CCC) released a damning report describing Kerr-Newell’s behaviour as “the very embodiment of corruption.”³ The two-year investigation found serious misconduct including using his position to appoint Bronwyn Little, with whom he had a long-term intimate relationship, to a strategic planning role he created; failing to disclose his financial interests in three New Zealand windfarm companies while serving as director and chairman; taking 24 days annual leave recorded as time-in-lieu to which he was not entitled, costing ratepayers approximately $78,000; and subverting procurement processes to favour a friend’s Toyota dealership.

The CCC found Kerr-Newell “placed his personal interests ahead of everyone else” and showed “disregard for the rules.”⁴ His employment was terminated following the investigation.

The critical question: Why was Kerr-Newell’s conduct not investigated during his tenure at three New Zealand councils? He left Rodney with payments that even the Auditor-General found “breached the Transitional Provisions Act”—yet Auckland Council claimed it had “no power to require repayment.” No investigation occurred.

In Australia, the CCC’s coercive powers, public hearings, and independent investigation exposed systematic corruption. In New Zealand, the same person moved between senior council positions for years without triggering any accountability mechanisms.

Mike Bush: Questions that follow to Victoria

Mike Bush served as New Zealand Police Commissioner from 2014 to 2020. In May 2025, he was appointed Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police—one of the most senior law enforcement positions in Australia.⁵

Bush’s tenure in New Zealand was marked by a significant controversy: his role in appointing Wally Haumaha to Deputy Commissioner despite being warned by senior officers, including Deputy Commissioner Mike Clement, about Haumaha’s history.⁶

During the 2004 Operation Austin investigation into police sex allegations, Haumaha had described Louise Nicholas’s rape allegations as “a nonsense” and said “nothing really happened and we have to stick together.” He had also described convicted rapists Brad Shipton and Bob Schollum as a “big softie” and a “legend” respectively.⁷

Despite being warned about this history, Bush sat on the State Services Commission panel that recommended Haumaha for the Deputy Commissioner role. When the appointment became public, Nicholas stated she “hit the roof” and the Government launched an inquiry.⁸

A subsequent Independent Police Conduct Authority investigation found Haumaha’s workplace behaviour towards three women was “unprofessional and inappropriate,” with some incidents constituting bullying as commonly understood.⁹

The question for Victoria: Would an Australian ICAC have investigated whether Bush properly managed the appointment process? Would his decision to proceed despite warnings from senior officers about a candidate’s history of dismissing rape allegations constitute conduct that impairs public confidence in public administration?

In New Zealand, Bush faced no investigation into his role in the appointment. The Scholtens inquiry cleared the process, finding it was “sound” despite acknowledging Bush knew Haumaha could be “forceful” and “demanding.” Bush retired in 2020 with honours and now leads Victoria Police.

These two cases—Kerr-Newell and Bush—demonstrate the fundamental difference between New Zealand and Australia: In Australia, independent anti-corruption commissions investigate conduct that might impair public confidence. In New Zealand, such conduct may simply follow individuals into new, more senior positions.

Australia’s anti-corruption architecture

State-by-state framework

Australia operates a comprehensive, multi-layered anti-corruption system. Every state maintains dedicated integrity agencies with substantial investigative powers, and since July 2023, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) provides federal-level oversight.¹⁰

New South Wales established the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1988, creating the template that other jurisdictions would follow.¹¹ The NSW ICAC possesses extensive powers including telephone intercepts, surveillance device warrants, and the ability to conduct public hearings that can compel testimony. Public officials summoned to ICAC have no right to silence—they must answer questions and produce evidence, even if self-incriminating.¹²

The NSW ICAC’s jurisdiction covers the entire public sector: state government agencies, local councils, members of Parliament, judges, and magistrates. Only police corruption falls outside its remit, handled instead by the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission.¹³ The commission receives between 2,000 and 3,000 reports annually and focuses investigative resources on matters deemed serious and systemic.¹⁴

Victoria’s Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC) commenced operations in February 2013.¹⁵ Queensland’s Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC), South Australia’s ICAC, Western Australia’s Corruption and Crime Commission, Tasmania’s Integrity Commission, and the Northern Territory’s Independent Commissioner Against Corruption complete the state framework.¹⁶ At the federal level, the NACC began operations on 1 July 2023.¹⁷

Defining corrupt conduct

The NSW ICAC Act defines corrupt conduct as any conduct that adversely affects the honest or impartial exercise of official functions by public officials.¹⁸ Critically, section 8(2A) captures conduct that “impairs, or could impair, public confidence in public administration,” including dishonestly obtaining public funds for private advantage and fraudulently obtaining public employment.¹⁹

Section 9 requires that conduct must constitute a criminal offence, disciplinary offence, grounds for termination, or—for Ministers—a substantial breach of an applicable code of conduct.²⁰ The NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct is prescribed specifically for this purpose, meaning its breach can constitute corrupt conduct subject to ICAC investigation.²¹

New Zealand’s limited framework

New Zealand’s primary corruption-fighting agency is the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), established following the 1987 stock market crash.²² However, its mandate is narrow: it focuses on “serious or complex fraud” and corruption offences require the Attorney-General’s leave before the SFO can commence proceedings.²³ This political gatekeeping function has no equivalent in Australia’s ICAC system.

The SFO has approximately 50 employees, compared to NSW ICAC’s substantially larger operation.²⁴ New Zealand has no dedicated anti-corruption commission with powers to proactively investigate political corruption. The Ombudsman focuses on maladministration rather than criminal corruption.²⁵

The Auckland Transport case: SFO resource constraints

The corruption uncovered

Between 2005 and 2013, a systematic culture of corruption operated within Auckland Transport and its predecessor Rodney District Council.⁶³ Senior manager Murray Noone received more than $1 million in bribes from contractor Stephen Borlase over seven years.⁶⁴ The payments were related to Noone’s role in awarding contracts worth tens of millions of dollars to Borlase’s company, Projenz.

The case involved a culture of largesse including long lunches for staff, such as an eight-hour affair at upmarket eatery Euro that cost $5,500.⁶⁵ In 2017, Borlase was sentenced to five and a half years in prison while Noone received five years.⁶⁶

Julie Read’s resource admission

Following the Auckland Transport convictions, SFO Director Julie Read made a revealing statement about resource constraints. In 2019, Read warned that the SFO didn’t have the resources to investigate and prosecute everyone involved in the corruption network, stating she had to “draw a line” to prevent using up too much of the court’s time.⁶⁷

This admission is extraordinary in its implications. Read acknowledged that known corruption had occurred involving multiple parties, yet prosecutorial decisions were being made based on resource constraints rather than the extent of criminal conduct. In essence, some corrupt officials escaped prosecution not because of insufficient evidence, but because New Zealand’s anti-corruption agency lacked the capacity to pursue all perpetrators.

Australian comparison: ICAC resources

The contrast with Australian ICACs is stark. NSW ICAC operates with a substantially larger budget and staff complement than New Zealand’s SFO. More importantly, ICAC’s mandate is specifically to investigate corruption, not to decide which corrupt officials to prosecute based on resource constraints.

In Australia, a corruption network of the Auckland Transport scale would trigger comprehensive ICAC investigation with power to compel testimony from all involved parties, conduct public hearings exposing the full extent of corruption, make findings against all individuals whose conduct met the threshold for corrupt conduct, and recommend criminal prosecution where evidence supported charges—not limited by court time constraints.

Even if not all individuals were criminally prosecuted, ICAC’s public findings would end political and professional careers across the network. The systematic exposure of corruption would prevent known corrupt officials from simply escaping consequences due to resource limitations.

Read’s admission that the SFO had to “draw a line” demonstrates New Zealand’s fundamental problem: anti-corruption enforcement is rationed based on agency capacity rather than the extent of corruption uncovered. In Australia, ICAC’s broader mandate and greater resources mean that corruption exposed is corruption addressed—through findings, public exposure, and consequences, even when criminal prosecution isn’t pursued.

Case study: Gladys Berejiklian and conflicts of interest

The investigation into former NSW Premier Gladys Berejiklian provides the most instructive comparison. ICAC’s Operation Keppel investigated whether Berejiklian had breached public trust during her secret five-year relationship with Wagga Wagga MP Daryl Maguire.²⁶ The investigation focused on grants to projects in Maguire’s electorate totalling $15.5 million.²⁷

On 29 June 2023, ICAC found Berejiklian engaged in serious corrupt conduct by failing to disclose her relationship, exercising official functions regarding funding without disclosure, substantially breaching the Ministerial Code, and refusing to report Maguire’s suspected corrupt conduct.²⁸ Despite these findings, ICAC did not recommend criminal prosecution due to evidentiary issues and the higher criminal burden of proof.²⁹

Nevertheless, Berejiklian resigned as Premier when the investigation was announced. She lost a Court of Appeal challenge to overturn the findings.³⁰ Her political career ended—demonstrating that ICAC’s power lies not in criminal prosecution, but in public exposure, formal findings, and political consequences.

New Zealand parallel: Judith Collins and conflicts of interest

“Dirty Politics” revealed a potential conflict of interest involving then-Justice Minister Judith Collins and Chinese dairy company Oravida.³¹ Collins’s husband was a director of Oravida. During an official trade delegation to China in 2013, Collins attended a dinner with Oravida executives and later publicly endorsed the company.³²

The revelation led to Collins’s brief resignation from Cabinet in 2014, but she returned to ministerial positions and later became leader of the National Party. No corruption investigation occurred. There was no independent examination with coercive powers, no public hearings, and no detailed report on whether Collins had properly managed conflicts of interest.

In Australia, under ICAC scrutiny, this would likely trigger investigation into whether Collins properly declared her conflict, whether her attendance and endorsement constituted misuse of ministerial position, whether she breached conflicts of interest provisions, and whether her conduct could impair public confidence in public administration.

“Whale Oil”: Criminal harassment and police failure

The systematic campaign against Matt Blomfield

Margie Thomson’s book “Whale Oil” documents a seven-year campaign of harassment by blogger Cameron Slater against Auckland businessman Matt Blomfield.³³ In May 2012, Blomfield found himself the target of a vicious online attack that destroyed his reputation and career.³⁴ The attack involved stolen hard drives containing personal emails and business files.³⁵

The campaign included relentless disclosure of Blomfield’s personal information over six months, constituting what the Human Rights Review Tribunal later ruled was a calculated attack and character assassination.³⁶ Two years after the online attack began, an armed gunman came to Blomfield’s house and tried to kill him. He only survived because the intruder’s shotgun misfired.³⁷

Blomfield spent seven years and hundreds of thousands of dollars taking a defamation case against Slater, ultimately winning and establishing that Slater’s vendetta was based entirely on lies.³⁸ In 2019, Slater was ordered to pay Blomfield $70,000 for causing severe humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings.³⁹

Police failure to investigate theft and harassment

The most troubling aspect of the Blomfield case is the police response—or lack thereof. Despite clear evidence that Slater had received stolen property (hard drives containing Blomfield’s private information), police never investigated the theft or who provided the stolen material to Slater.⁴⁰

Following the gunman's attack, Police informed Blomfield that it was a "hitjob." Despite Blomfield informing the Police that he suspected Slater's involvement, Police never investigated such a link - even after the perpetrator was arrested and eventually imprisoned.

Multiple state bodies—the SFO, MBIE, IRD, Privacy Commissioner, and Human Rights Review Tribunal—examined the same stolen materials and found Slater’s claims to be “complete and utter bullshit.”⁴¹ Yet police took no action against those who stole the property or those who received and published it.

The contrast with police reaction when Slater himself was hacked by “Rawshark” is stark. When Slater’s emails were stolen and provided to Nicky Hager for “Dirty Politics,” police conducted extensive investigations including raiding Hager’s home and accessing his financial records—actions for which police later apologized and paid substantial compensation.⁴²

Would Australian police have investigated?

Under Australian frameworks, the Blomfield case would likely have triggered multiple investigations. Criminal harassment charges: The systematic six-month campaign of publishing private information, combined with the coordinated nature of attacks, would likely constitute criminal harassment under various Australian state laws. NSW Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 and similar legislation in other states specifically criminalizes stalking and intimidation, including cyberstalking.

Theft and receiving stolen property: The theft of Blomfield’s hard drives and Slater’s receipt and use of stolen property would constitute clear criminal offences under Australian law. Police would be expected to investigate who stole the drives, who provided them to Slater, and whether Slater knowingly received stolen property.

Conspiracy charges: If evidence showed coordination between multiple parties in the theft, distribution, and publication of stolen materials, conspiracy charges could be laid under Australian criminal law.

The failure of New Zealand Police to investigate these matters represents a significant accountability gap. In Australia, such failures would themselves be subject to investigation by integrity commissions with jurisdiction over police conduct.

Mark Mitchell: Police Minister and the dirty politics network

In the book "Dirty Politics", it was evident that "the usual suspects" (and Cam Slater) did the dirty work for politicians. (Source of image: X.com)

Mitchell’s role in “Dirty Politics”

In 2014, Nicky Hager’s book “Dirty Politics” presented evidence suggesting that Mark Mitchell had hired political strategist Simon Lusk during the National Party selection process for the Rodney electorate.⁴³ Lusk appeared to have collaborated with blogger Cameron Slater to discredit Mitchell’s opponents, particularly Brent Robinson. Mitchell strongly denies ever paying Lusk or Slater, but admitted Lusk had given him guidance on speeches and brochures.

Mitchell has served as Police Minister since November 2023. His tenure has been marked by controversy surrounding the handling of complaints against former Deputy Police Commissioner Jevon McSkimming.⁴⁴ In November 2024, the Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA) released a damning report criticizing police’s handling of serious allegations against McSkimming, including sexual misconduct and misuse of police resources.

The McSkimming scandal and Mitchell’s knowledge

Thirty-six emails containing allegations about McSkimming’s behaviour were sent to Mitchell’s parliamentary office between December 2023 and November 2024.⁴⁵ Mitchell claimed he never saw them, stating that former Police Commissioner Andrew Coster had directed police staff in the ministerial office to send emails directly to Coster’s office without sharing them with the minister or his political staff.⁴⁶

However, it was later revealed that Mitchell’s electorate office staff—including his sister—had replied to at least one email from the complainant in January 2024, stating the email related to Mitchell’s ministerial role and would be forwarded to his parliamentary office.⁴⁷

Former Commissioner Coster has disputed Mitchell’s timeline, claiming he had informed Mitchell about the allegations earlier than November 2024 through informal conversations during 2024.⁴⁸ Mitchell has denied this, stating Coster’s “recollections are wrong” and that “there is no way I was only just being told about this in my last couple of weeks in the job.”⁴⁹

Would Australian oversight have prevented this?

In any Australian state with an ICAC, several aspects of this situation would likely trigger investigation. First, the systematic failure of police to properly handle serious complaints against a senior officer would be examined for potential misconduct or corrupt conduct. Second, the question of whether the Police Minister was deliberately kept uninformed about serious allegations would be investigated with coercive powers to compel testimony from all parties involved.

Third, the protocol that prevented ministerial staff from seeing complaints sent to the minister’s office would be scrutinized as potentially impairing public confidence in police accountability. Fourth, the conflicting accounts between Mitchell and Coster about when the minister was informed would be resolved through public hearings with witnesses under oath.

Most critically, in Australia such matters would not depend on media investigations or parliamentary questions to surface. Integrity commissions can act on complaints, initiate investigations on their own motion, and have mandatory reporting requirements for serious misconduct. The systematic failures documented in the IPCA report would almost certainly trigger an ICAC investigation into whether police conduct constituted corrupt conduct under provisions covering behaviour that impairs public confidence in public administration.

“Dirty Politics” and coordinated harassment campaigns

The Cameron Slater network

“Dirty Politics” documented extensive coordination between Prime Minister John Key’s office and Cameron Slater’s blog for political attacks.⁵⁰ Jason Ede, a staffer in Key’s office employed by Ministerial Services and paid by taxpayers, fed information to Slater for use in attacks on political opponents.⁵¹

The book revealed how Justice Minister Judith Collins communicated extensively with Slater, including emails suggesting she was providing information about SFO boss Adam Feely. An email from Slater stated Collins was “gunning” for Feely and that “Any information that we can provide her on his background is appreciated.”⁵²

Criminal harassment or legitimate political commentary?

A critical question emerges: did the coordinated campaigns documented in “Dirty Politics” constitute criminal harassment that should have been investigated by police?

Under New Zealand’s Harassment Act 1997, harassment is defined as a pattern of behaviour that causes distress to another person. The Act specifically criminalizes causing another person to fear for their safety through specified acts including threatening, intimidating, or otherwise harmful behaviour.

The systematic nature of attacks documented in “Dirty Politics”—coordinated between government officials and bloggers, using information obtained from official sources, targeting specific individuals repeatedly over extended periods—raises serious questions about whether this crossed the line from political commentary into criminal harassment.

Australian comparison: Harassment and stalking laws

Australian states have comprehensive harassment and stalking legislation that would likely capture coordinated online campaigns. NSW: The Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 defines stalking and intimidation broadly, including following, watching, or contacting a person, and any conduct causing reasonable apprehension of harm. The law explicitly includes electronic communications and social media.

Victoria: The Crimes Act 1958 contains stalking provisions that include using the internet or email to publish or transmit offensive material about a person. The law doesn’t require proof of intent to cause harm—only that the conduct would cause a reasonable person to feel apprehension.

Queensland: The Criminal Code Act 1899 criminalizes unlawful stalking, including cyberstalking, with penalties up to 5 years imprisonment. The law specifically includes conduct involving technology.

Jordan Williams: The networker and his conduct

Williams’s role in “Dirty Politics”

Jordan Williams, founder and executive director of the Taxpayers’ Union, appears repeatedly in “Dirty Politics” as what Nicky Hager characterized as “an enthusiastic helper, ready to help dig dirt on the latest target.”⁶⁸ Williams was a known associate of Cameron Slater, political strategist Simon Lusk, and National Party figures including Justice Minister Judith Collins.

Williams admitted after the book’s publication that he and Slater still spoke “every day.” His role involved coordination between the network of bloggers and political operatives who conducted systematic attacks on political opponents and private individuals.

The false identity scandal

In October 2018, the NZ Herald exposed that the Taxpayers’ Union, under Williams’s leadership, had systematically used false identities to make Official Information Act requests to government agencies.⁶⁹ The investigation found one single Taxpayers’ Union email address linked to nine fictitious people who filed OIA requests, including details later used by the lobby group to disseminate stories in the media.

Williams initially claimed the use of fake names was “the exception,” but later admitted the group had probably used the practice “less than 40 times” during its five-year existence.⁷⁰ He defended the practice as being in the public interest because some government agencies appeared to be “stonewalling” the organization.

The Herald investigation found it impossible to attach real people to many of the 14 identities used in OIA requests. People whose names were used—including Mitchell Yee, a student and K-Pop dancer in Auckland, and Randall Savage, a motorcycle mechanic—confirmed they had not made any such requests.⁷¹

While using false identities for OIA requests is not technically illegal in New Zealand (the OIA doesn’t require requesters to use real names), the systematic nature of the deception raised serious questions about professional ethics for a practicing lawyer.

The Colin Craig defamation saga

In 2015, Williams became embroiled in a complex defamation dispute with former Conservative Party leader Colin Craig. After Craig’s press secretary Rachel MacGregor approached Williams with allegations about Craig’s conduct, Williams “decided to pass these allegations on to others within the Conservative Party and ultimately to Whale Oil.”⁷²

Following a four-week trial in 2016, a High Court jury found Craig had defamed Williams and awarded him $1.27 million in damages—the highest ever defamation award in New Zealand’s legal history.⁷³ However, the trial judge subsequently found the amount excessive and constituted a miscarriage of justice, setting aside the verdict and ordering a retrial.

The case wound through the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. In 2019, Williams issued a public apology to Craig, admitting: “I am now aware that a number of statements I made to others about Mr Craig were not true. I deeply regret what has happened and my involvement in spreading those allegations.”⁷⁴ Williams paid an undisclosed sum to Craig in confidential settlement.

The case revealed that Williams had spread unverified allegations about Craig without MacGregor’s permission or consent, and ultimately had to admit publicly that some of his statements were false.

Would Williams face disciplinary action?

As a practicing lawyer in New Zealand, Williams’s conduct raises significant questions about professional ethics and potential disciplinary consequences in both New Zealand and Australia.

In New Zealand, the Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal can take action against lawyers for “unsatisfactory professional conduct” or “professional misconduct.” Professional misconduct is conduct that would be “reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by professional brethren of good repute and competency.”

Williams’s conduct potentially implicating disciplinary standards includes: systematically using false identities to obtain government information, albeit in a context where such use was technically legal; spreading false allegations that he later had to publicly retract and apologize for; coordinating with bloggers to “dig dirt” on targets, as documented in “Dirty Politics”; and acting as an intermediary in spreading unverified allegations without the complainant’s consent.

In New Zealand, no disciplinary action has been taken against Williams. The false identity scandal resulted in public embarrassment but no formal investigation. The Colin Craig case resulted in a financial settlement but no professional consequences.

Australian comparison: Professional standards

In Australia, lawyers face more rigorous oversight not only from disciplinary tribunals but also from ICAC-style bodies that can investigate conduct impairing public confidence in public administration.

The systematic use of false identities to obtain government information would likely attract scrutiny in Australia. ICAC investigation: Even if technically legal, systematic deception of government agencies could be investigated as conduct impairing public confidence in public administration under ICAC frameworks. Disciplinary tribunal: Australian legal professional conduct rules emphasize honesty and integrity. Systematic use of false identities, even for “public interest” purposes, could constitute professional misconduct. Professional sanctions: Findings could range from reprimand and conditions on practice to suspension or striking off, depending on seriousness.

The spreading of false allegations that later required public apology would also likely result in disciplinary investigation in Australia. Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules require lawyers to act honestly and with integrity both in professional capacity and in conduct that might affect fitness to practice law. Spreading false allegations, particularly when acting as an intermediary without the complainant’s consent, could constitute conduct “disgraceful or dishonourable” under Australian standards. The subsequent admission that statements were untrue and payment of confidential settlement would likely trigger investigation into whether the lawyer’s conduct met professional standards.

The coordination documented in “Dirty Politics”—acting as an “enthusiastic helper” to “dig dirt” on targets—would likely face examination in Australia as to whether such conduct constituted conduct unbecoming of a legal practitioner, demonstrated fitness to practice law, and met the profession’s standards of integrity and honesty.

The striking off question

Would Williams be struck off (disbarred) in New Zealand or Australia?

In New Zealand, striking off is reserved for the most serious misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice. Examples include misappropriation of client funds, providing false evidence, or systematic dishonesty. Williams’s conduct, while ethically questionable, likely wouldn’t meet the threshold for striking off in New Zealand—particularly given that no disciplinary proceedings have been initiated.

In Australia, the threshold is similar. However, the combination of factors—systematic use of false identities (even if technically legal), spreading false allegations requiring public retraction, and documented coordination in “dirty politics” campaigns—could potentially result in formal disciplinary investigation, findings of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, sanctions ranging from reprimand to suspension, potentially with conditions on practice, and possible striking off only if the conduct was found to demonstrate fundamental unfitness to practice law.

The more likely outcome in Australia would be formal investigation, findings of misconduct, and sanctions short of striking off—but with permanent records on the disciplinary register that would affect reputation and practice. The key difference from New Zealand is that such conduct would likely trigger investigation in the first place.

The Winston Peters superannuation leak: State responsibility

The leak and its timing

In May 2017, the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) discovered that Winston Peters, then leader of New Zealand First, had been overpaid superannuation for seven years—receiving the single person’s rate despite being in a long-term relationship with partner Jan Trotman.⁵³ The overpayment occurred because of an incomplete application form that MSD had processed. Peters immediately repaid the $18,000 difference once notified.

In August 2017—one month before the general election and at a critical point in campaign negotiations—anonymous calls began reaching journalists with details of Peters’ overpayment and MSD’s investigation.⁵⁴ The leak was clearly designed to embarrass Peters and cause political harm during the election campaign.

The High Court later found that Peters’ privacy was “deliberately breached in the lead-up to the 2017 general election to publicly embarrass him and cause him harm.”⁵⁵ However, Peters could not identify who made the leak. An MSD internal investigation found that 41 staff were involved “in some way” in the case, but concluded “there is no evidence to indicate that any staff member in MSD is the source of the leak.”⁵⁶

The accountability failure

The critical point about the Peters case is not whether Peters should have sued—it’s whether New Zealand authorities should have treated the leak as a serious criminal matter requiring prosecution.

Privacy Commissioner John Edwards stated at the time that “a breach relating to tax information could result in a criminal prosecution.”⁵⁷ Yet despite the court finding deliberate breach of privacy with intent to cause harm, no criminal investigation or prosecution occurred.

Peters was left to pursue civil action at enormous personal cost. He ultimately paid $320,000 in legal costs after being unable to identify the leaker—despite the court accepting that a deliberate, malicious breach occurred. The Crown’s costs for defending the case exceeded $1 million.

The situation reveals a fundamental problem: when government agencies leak private information for political purposes, individual victims are expected to identify and sue the leaker at their own expense. No state agency took responsibility for investigating and prosecuting what the court found to be a deliberate, harmful breach of privacy.

What should have happened in New Zealand

When a court finds that private information held by a government agency was deliberately leaked to cause political harm, several state responses should occur. Police investigation: The deliberate, unauthorized disclosure of confidential government information should trigger criminal investigation under the Crimes Act 1961 and Privacy Act provisions.

State Services Commission inquiry: Systematic investigation into how 41 staff had access to sensitive information and how security was breached. MSD accountability: The agency that processed an incomplete form and then failed to secure the information should face consequences. Criminal prosecution: If the Privacy Commissioner confirmed breach of tax/benefit information could result in prosecution, charges should have been laid against identified perpetrators.

Instead, Peters faced the impossible task of identifying the leaker from among 41 possible MSD staff, ministers, ministerial staff, and anyone who might have overheard conversations or seen documents. The burden fell entirely on the victim rather than the state agencies responsible for securing the information.

Australian comparison: How ICACs would respond

In any Australian state with an ICAC, the Peters leak would have triggered comprehensive investigation. Immediate ICAC investigation: Deliberate leak of confidential government information for political purposes during an election would be investigated as potential corrupt conduct under provisions covering conduct that impairs public confidence in public administration.

Coercive powers: ICAC could compel testimony from all 41 MSD staff, ministers, ministerial staff, and others with knowledge. Unlike civil litigation, ICAC witnesses have no right to silence. Telephone and email analysis: ICAC could obtain warrants for telephone intercepts and email records to track communications between government staff and media.

Public hearings: The investigation would likely include public hearings examining how confidential information was handled and who had access. Findings and consequences: Even if the specific leaker couldn’t be identified, ICAC could make findings about systemic failures, ministerial responsibility, and whether conduct impaired public confidence.

More importantly, the investigation would not depend on the victim pursuing expensive civil litigation. The state would take responsibility for investigating misuse of confidential government information.

Criminal prosecution in Australia

Australian states have specific offences for unauthorized disclosure of confidential government information. NSW: Crimes Act provisions criminalizing disclosure of official information by public servants. Victoria: Public Administration Act 2004 makes it an offence for public officials to improperly disclose confidential information. Commonwealth: Crimes Act 1914 provisions covering unauthorized disclosure by Commonwealth officers.

If an Australian ICAC investigation identified the leaker, criminal prosecution would likely follow. Even without identifying the specific individual, findings of systemic failure and ministerial accountability would occur—creating political and professional consequences that don’t depend on the victim’s ability to fund litigation.

The contrast is stark: In New Zealand, the victim pays $320,000 trying to identify the perpetrator. In Australia, the state investigates, potentially prosecutes, and makes public findings about accountability—all without requiring the victim to fund the process.

Paula Bennett, Anne Tolley, Nick Smith, David Farrar: Where are they now?

Paula Bennett: Social media attacks and privacy breaches

“Dirty Politics” documented Social Development Minister Paula Bennett’s participation in attacks on beneficiaries who criticized her policies.⁷⁵ In 2009, Bennett publicly released private information about two solo mothers who had questioned her policy of removing the Training Incentive Allowance for beneficiaries. She disclosed that the women had received substantial benefit payments, information they had not made public themselves.⁷⁶

The Privacy Commissioner found Bennett had breached the women’s privacy. Yet Bennett defended her actions and faced no further consequences. She went on to serve as Deputy Prime Minister from 2016 to 2017 and is now a company director and chair of the New Zealand Social Infrastructure Fund.⁷⁷

In Australia, Bennett’s deliberate disclosure of private benefit information to discredit critics would likely trigger ICAC investigation into whether this constituted misuse of ministerial position, abuse of access to confidential government information, and conduct impairing public confidence in public administration. The Privacy Commissioner’s finding of breach would support ICAC findings of corrupt conduct. Bennett’s career would likely have ended following such findings.

Anne Tolley: SIS information and attack politics

“Dirty Politics” revealed that Anne Tolley, then Minister of Education and Minister responsible for the SIS, was involved in the network of ministers and bloggers coordinating political attacks.⁷⁸ Emails showed Tolley in contact with Cameron Slater and apparently aware of how sensitive information might be used for political purposes.

Tolley went on to become Minister of Police from 2014 to 2017 and later served as Deputy Speaker of the House from 2017 to 2020. She is now a company director and chair of Transparency International's New Zealand branch.⁷⁹

In Australia, a minister with SIS responsibilities participating in coordinated attacks using sensitive information would face intense ICAC scrutiny. The question of whether classified information or security-sensitive material was misused for partisan purposes would trigger investigation into potential corrupt conduct and breach of ministerial codes.

Nick Smith: ACC and political interference

“Dirty Politics” documented ACC Minister Nick Smith’s involvement in undermining ACC claimants who were critical of government policy.⁸⁰ Smith was forced to resign as a minister in 2012 after the Bronwyn Pullar case, where he was found to have improperly intervened in an ACC claim involving a party supporter, but he later returned to Cabinet.

Smith resigned from Parliament in 2021 following a complaint about bullying and harassment.⁸¹ He then worked as a consultant, then was elected mayor of Nelson City Council.

In Australia, Smith’s pattern of conduct—improper ministerial intervention in ACC claims, coordination with attack bloggers, and subsequent bullying findings—would likely result in ICAC investigation and findings preventing any return to ministerial office. The combination of misconduct across multiple incidents would support findings of serious corrupt conduct, effectively ending his political career.

David Farrar: The polling consultant and blogger

David Farrar runs the Kiwiblog and Curia Market Research, which conducts polling for the National Party.⁸² ”Dirty Politics” documented Farrar’s role in the network, including coordinating with Cameron Slater and providing a veneer of statistical respectability to political attacks through selective polling and data presentation.

Farrar continues to operate Curia Market Research, conducting polling for political parties and corporate clients. He remains a prominent political commentator and blogger.

In Australia, the relationship between a party’s paid pollster and anonymous attack blogs would attract scrutiny regarding whether research funded by political parties was being misused for coordinated harassment campaigns. While not necessarily rising to corrupt conduct, Australian political parties have stricter rules about third-party campaigns and disclosure of political activities.

The career progression problem

The critical point about Bennett, Tolley, Smith, and Farrar is that despite documented involvement in coordinated attacks using government resources and sensitive information, all went on to significant roles after “Dirty Politics” was published. Bennett became Deputy PM. Tolley became Deputy Speaker. Smith returned to Cabinet, then became a mayor. Farrar continues as a political consultant.

In Australia, ICAC findings of corrupt conduct would have ended these political careers permanently. Even without criminal prosecution, the formal findings and public exposure would create reputational damage preventing return to high office. The fact that these individuals faced no independent investigation and continued to prominent positions demonstrates New Zealand’s accountability deficit.

The continuing pattern

Stuart Nash: Cabinet confidentiality breaches

In March 2023, Labour Minister Stuart Nash was sacked from Cabinet after emailing confidential details from a 2020 Cabinet meeting to two businessmen who were party donors.⁵⁸ Nash also advocated for a donor to receive government appointments.⁵⁹ This breached Cabinet Manual rules on secrecy and raised concerns over undue influence from donors.

In Australia, under ICAC frameworks, Nash’s conduct would trigger investigation into whether sharing Cabinet confidences with donors constituted misuse of official information, whether donor relationships created conflicts of interest, whether this impaired public confidence in public administration (section 8(2A) of NSW ICAC Act), and whether substantial breaches of ministerial codes occurred.

The likely outcome would be findings of serious corrupt conduct for misusing ministerial position and breaching confidentiality requirements. While criminal charges might not result, Nash’s political career would likely end permanently following public ICAC hearings and formal findings.

Michael Wood: Conflicts of interest

In June 2023, Labour Transport Minister Michael Wood resigned after failing to disclose and divest shares in Auckland International Airport worth approximately $13,000, despite multiple reminders from the Cabinet Office over 16 communications.⁶⁰ Wood’s portfolio included direct oversight of matters affecting the airport.

In Australia, this would likely trigger ICAC investigation into whether Wood’s failure to divest shares while making decisions affecting the airport constituted corrupt conduct, whether his repeated failures to comply with disclosure requirements breached ministerial codes substantially, and whether this conduct impaired public confidence in public administration.

Based on the Berejiklian precedent, Wood’s persistent failure to manage conflicts despite multiple warnings would likely result in findings of serious corrupt conduct. While not criminal, such findings would end his political career.

Golriz Ghahraman: Theft charges

In January 2024, Green Party MP Golriz Ghahraman was charged with four counts of shoplifting, stealing clothing worth approximately $9,000 from luxury stores.⁶¹ Ghahraman resigned from Parliament and later pleaded guilty, receiving a conviction and fine of $1,600 plus court costs.⁶²

Ghahraman’s case represents clear criminal conduct that resulted in prosecution and conviction. While not corruption per se, it demonstrates that New Zealand’s criminal justice system does function when evidence is clear and victims (retailers) pursue complaints.

The contrast with corruption cases is instructive: theft of luxury goods resulted in swift police action, charges, and conviction. Yet systematic theft of private information (Blomfield case), misuse of public resources for political purposes (Ede case), and breaches of Cabinet confidentiality (Nash case) resulted in no police investigation or charges.

Systematic police failures to investigate corruption

The selective enforcement pattern

A troubling pattern emerges from examining New Zealand political scandals: police investigate and prosecute clear-cut criminal offences (theft, assault, bribery) but fail to investigate conduct that might constitute political corruption, even when that conduct involves theft, harassment, or misuse of office.

Examples of police failures to investigate include: The theft of Matt Blomfield’s hard drives and subsequent publication of stolen materials—despite clear evidence of theft and receipt of stolen property, police never investigated who stole the drives or charged Slater with receiving stolen property. The coordination between government officials and partisan bloggers using public resources—despite “Dirty Politics” documenting systematic misuse of publicly-funded staff and resources for partisan political purposes, police conducted no investigation into whether this constituted obtaining public funds by deception or theft by a person in a special relationship.

The provision of official information to bloggers for harassment campaigns—despite evidence that ministers and officials provided information for use in attacks on individuals, police conducted no investigation into whether this constituted misuse of official information or abuse of public office. The Winston Peters superannuation leak—despite a court finding deliberate breach of privacy with intent to cause political harm, police conducted no criminal investigation or prosecution.

Would Australian police investigate?

The critical difference in Australia is that police conduct itself falls under integrity commission oversight. If Australian police failed to investigate apparent corruption involving theft, harassment, or misuse of office, the integrity commission could investigate why police failed to act on credible evidence of criminal conduct, examine whether political pressure influenced police decisions not to investigate, determine whether police failures constituted misconduct or corrupt conduct, make findings and recommendations that could end police careers, and refer matters for criminal prosecution if police failures involved corrupt conduct.

In New Zealand, there is no equivalent independent oversight of police decisions not to investigate political corruption. The Independent Police Conduct Authority focuses on use of force and procedural complaints, not systemic failures to investigate political corruption.

The “would they go to jail?” question

Distinguishing findings from prosecution

The question “would they go to jail?” requires understanding that Australian ICACs can find serious corrupt conduct on the balance of probabilities, but criminal convictions require proof beyond reasonable doubt. Many politicians found corrupt by ICACs haven’t been criminally prosecuted.

Gladys Berejiklian wasn’t prosecuted despite ICAC’s findings. Nick Greiner, a former NSW Premier, was found “technically corrupt” in 1992 but later cleared by the Court of Appeal—though he had already resigned.⁸³

Most conduct documented in “Dirty Politics,” “Whale Oil,” and post-2023 scandals would likely not result in jail time if it occurred in Australia, for the same reasons Berejiklian wasn’t prosecuted: the conduct involves misuse of public resources, failure to manage conflicts, and breaches of codes rather than clear criminal offences.

The real consequence: Political accountability

The crucial point is that “going to jail” isn’t the primary accountability mechanism. The more immediate consequence is destruction of political careers through public exposure through ICAC hearings and reports, formal findings of corrupt conduct that create permanent records, political consequences that end careers even without criminal charges, deterrent effects on current and future officials, and systemic reforms to prevent future misconduct.

Berejiklian’s career ended when ICAC announced its investigation. Multiple Victorian MPs lost positions following IBAC’s branch stacking investigation without criminal charges.⁸⁴ The Australian system’s power lies in certainty of exposure and accountability, not imprisonment.

Criminal harassment: A different question

However, the harassment campaigns documented in “Whale Oil” and “Dirty Politics” raise a different question: would those engaged in coordinated harassment face criminal prosecution in Australia?

The answer is likely yes. Australian harassment and stalking laws specifically criminalize systematic campaigns of online harassment using technology, publication of private information intended to cause distress, coordinated campaigns by multiple parties targeting individuals, and conduct causing reasonable apprehension of harm to safety or reputation.

The armed attack on Matt Blomfield following two years of online harassment would trigger serious police investigation in Australia into whether the online campaign constituted criminal stalking that led to the attack, whether those coordinating the harassment could be charged with conspiracy or being accessories, and whether the systematic nature of attacks demonstrated organized criminal activity.

Conclusion: The accountability deficit

The evidence is clear: New Zealand operates with a significant integrity deficit compared to Australia. Behaviour that would end political careers across the Tasman occurs in New Zealand with limited consequences.

Would they go to jail? Probably not—at least not for the types of conduct involving conflicts of interest, misuse of public resources, and breaches of ministerial codes. Just as Berejiklian didn’t face criminal prosecution, most New Zealand politicians engaged in similar behaviour likely wouldn’t either.

But would they survive politically? In Australia, clearly no. Would coordinated harassment campaigns be investigated and prosecuted? In Australia, likely yes.

More troubling is the systematic failure of New Zealand Police to investigate conduct that appears to constitute criminal harassment, theft, and conspiracy. The contrast between the aggressive investigation when Cameron Slater was hacked versus the complete inaction when Matt Blomfield was victimized reveals a disturbing double standard.

The activities documented in “Dirty Politics,” “Whale Oil,” and recent scandals wouldn’t just be investigated in Australia—they would end careers, generate criminal harassment prosecutions, and create lasting consequences. In New Zealand, they’ve become footnotes in political history.

Australia provides the template. Every state maintains dedicated anti-corruption commissions. These institutions create accountability through public exposure, formal findings, and political consequences—even without criminal prosecution. They also provide oversight of police conduct, ensuring that failures to investigate corruption are themselves investigated.

New Zealand’s choice is whether to continue relying on a system that clearly allows political corruption and criminal harassment to operate with limited consequences, or to implement robust anti-corruption infrastructure that would subject such behaviour to the same scrutiny and accountability it would face in Australia.

The evidence suggests that without such infrastructure, New Zealand’s reputation for clean government rests more on fortunate absence of exposure than on systematic prevention and accountability. When exposure does occur—through journalists like Hager and Thomson rather than independent commissions—the response is inadequate: brief controversies, selective resignations, and no systematic accountability.

That is the integrity gap. And it is substantial.

Endnotes

¹ ’Corruption in Australia.’ Wikipedia, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

² ’Corruption watchdog raids offices.’ Local Matters, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

³ ’NZer’s behaviour ‘the very embodiment of corruption’.’ RNZ News, 6 September 2018. (Link)

⁴ Ibid. (Link)

⁵ ’Mike Bush appointed Victoria Police Chief Commissioner.’ The Age, 21 May 2025. (Link)

⁶ ’Mike Bush warned about Wally Haumaha before appointment.’ RNZ News, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

⁷ ’Haumaha comments about Louise Nicholas investigation revealed.’ Stuff, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

⁸ ’Louise Nicholas hits roof over Wally Haumaha appointment.’ NZ Herald, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

⁹ ’IPCA finds Wally Haumaha conduct unprofessional.’ RNZ News, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

¹⁰ ’National Anti-Corruption Commission.’ Attorney-General’s Department, 19 December 2024. (Link)

¹¹ ’The role of the ICAC.’ Independent Commission Against Corruption, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

¹² Ibid. (Link)

¹³ Ibid. (Link)

¹⁴ ’Corruption in New South Wales.’ Wikipedia, 2 June 2025. (Link)

¹⁵ ’Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission.’ Wikipedia, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

¹⁶ ’Integrity Commission (Tasmania).’ Wikipedia, 6 December 2024. (Link)

¹⁷ ’National Anti-Corruption Commission (Australia).’ Wikipedia, 5 days ago. (Link)

¹⁸ ’Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the ICAC Act.’ Independent Commission Against Corruption, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

¹⁹ Ibid. (Link)

²⁰ Ibid. (Link)

²¹ ’NSW Ministerial Code of Conduct.’ ICAC Regulation 2017, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

²² ’Serious Fraud Office (New Zealand).’ Wikipedia, 26 August 2025. (Link)

²³ ’Legislation.’ Serious Fraud Office, New Zealand, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

²⁴ ’Serious Fraud Office (New Zealand).’ Wikipedia, 26 August 2025. (Link)

²⁵ ’Corruption in New Zealand.’ Wikipedia, 31 October 2025. (Link)

²⁶ ’Operation Keppel finds former premier and then member for Wagga Wagga corrupt.’ Independent Commission Against Corruption, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

²⁷ Klan, Anthony. ‘Berejiklian escapes prosecution despite ICAC corruption verdict.’ Independent Australia, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

²⁸ ’Operation Keppel finds former premier and then member for Wagga Wagga corrupt.’ Independent Commission Against Corruption, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

²⁹ ’Gladys Berejiklian ICAC report: Why won’t she be charged?’ Law Society Journal, 30 June 2023. (Link)

³⁰ ’Corruption findings upheld against Gladys Berejiklian.’ SBS News, 26 July 2024. (Link)

³¹ ’Dirty Politics.’ Wikipedia, 1 October 2025. (Link)

³² Ibid. (Link)

³³ Thomson, Margie. Whale Oil. Potton & Burton, 2019. (Link)

³⁴ Ibid. (Link)

³⁵ ’The 10 most shocking moments in the blistering new book ‘Whale Oil’.’ The Spinoff, 28 May 2019. (Link)

³⁶ ’New book looks at battle between Slater and Blomfield.’ RNZ News, 28 May 2019. (Link)

³⁷ Thomson, Margie. Whale Oil. Potton & Burton, 2019. (Link)

³⁸ Ibid. (Link)

³⁹ ’New book looks at battle between Slater and Blomfield.’ RNZ News, 28 May 2019. (Link)

⁴⁰ ’Whale Oil -- the book.’ The Standard, 28 May 2019. (Link)

⁴¹ Ibid. (Link)

⁴² ’Nicky Hager.’ Wikipedia, 18 August 2025. (Link)

⁴³ ’Dirty Politics.’ Wikipedia, 1 October 2025. (Link)

⁴⁴ ’Police Minister Mark Mitchell faces questions over McSkimming scandal.’ Stuff, November 2024. (Link)

⁴⁵ ’Emails sent to Mark Mitchell’s office about McSkimming allegations.’ NZ Herald, November 2024. (Link)

⁴⁶ Ibid. (Link)

⁴⁷ ’Mitchell’s electorate office replied to McSkimming complaint email.’ RNZ News, November 2024. (Link)

⁴⁸ ’Andrew Coster disputes Mark Mitchell’s timeline on McSkimming.’ Stuff, November 2024. (Link)

⁴⁹ Ibid. (Link)

⁵⁰ ’Dirty Politics.’ Wikipedia, 1 October 2025. (Link)

⁵¹ Ibid. (Link)

⁵² Ibid. (Link)

⁵³ ’Winston Peters to pay $320,000 over failed superannuation leak privacy court case.’ NZ Herald, 20 July 2020. (Link)

⁵⁴ Ibid. (Link)

⁵⁵ Ibid. (Link)

⁵⁶ ’Winston Peters’ privacy breach ‘insidious’, court told.’ 1News, 3 November 2019. (Link)

⁵⁷ ’Investigations over pension leak as Peters plans complaint.’ RNZ News, 29 August 2017. (Link)

⁵⁸ ’Stuart Nash sacked from Cabinet over donor emails.’ RNZ News, March 2023. (Link)

⁵⁹ ’List of political scandals in New Zealand.’ Wikipedia, 4 July 2025. (Link)

⁶⁰ ’Michael Wood resigns over airport shares conflict.’ NZ Herald, June 2023. (Link)

⁶¹ ’Golriz Ghahraman charged with shoplifting.’ Stuff, January 2024. (Link)

⁶² ’Golriz Ghahraman pleads guilty, fined for shoplifting.’ RNZ News, June 2024. (Link)

⁶³ ’Auckland Transport corruption: Murray Noone and Stephen Borlase sentenced.’ NZ Herald, 2017. (Link)

⁶⁴ Ibid. (Link)

⁶⁵ Ibid. (Link)

⁶⁶ Ibid. (Link)

⁶⁷ ’SFO Director Julie Read on Auckland Transport case resource constraints.’ Newsroom, 2019. (Link)

⁶⁸ ’Dirty Politics.’ Wikipedia, 1 October 2025. (Link)

⁶⁹ Fisher, David. ‘How right-wing lobby group NZ Taxpayers’ Union used false identities to make OIA request.’ NZ Herald, 3 October 2018. (Link)

⁷⁰ ’Lobbyist: Using fake names with OIA requests in public interest.’ RNZ News, 4 October 2018. (Link)

⁷¹ Fisher, David. ‘How right-wing lobby group NZ Taxpayers’ Union used false identities to make OIA request.’ NZ Herald, 3 October 2018. (Link)

⁷² ’Colin Craig and Jordan Williams reach confidential settlement.’ RNZ News, 2 December 2019. (Link)

⁷³ ’Jordan Williams defamation case against Colin Craig: Retrial ordered by Supreme Court.’ RNZ News, 11 April 2019. (Link)

⁷⁴ ’Colin Craig and Jordan Williams reach confidential settlement.’ RNZ News, 2 December 2019. (Link)

⁷⁵ ’Dirty Politics.’ Wikipedia, 1 October 2025. (Link)

⁷⁶ ’Paula Bennett releases private information about beneficiaries.’ NZ Herald, 2009. (Link)

⁷⁷ ’Paula Bennett.’ Wikipedia, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

⁷⁸ ’Dirty Politics.’ Wikipedia, 1 October 2025. (Link)

⁷⁹ ’Anne Tolley.’ Wikipedia, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

⁸⁰ ’Dirty Politics.’ Wikipedia, 1 October 2025. (Link)

⁸¹ ’Nick Smith resigns from Parliament.’ Stuff, 2021. (Link)

⁸² ’David Farrar.’ Wikipedia, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

⁸³ ’Independent Commission Against Corruption (New South Wales).’ Wikipedia, 18 August 2025. (Link)

⁸⁴ ’Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission.’ Wikipedia, accessed 6 December 2024. (Link)

Publishing • Production • Communications

Contents

Introduction: The integrity gap